



**NEA workshop**

**Innovation in water cooled reactor technologies**

12 February 2015



# Gen 3 Genesis

Three Miles Island

- Modifications on operating plants (**human factor, severe accidents**)
- **Considerable R&D on severe accidents**

Chernobyl

**Eliminate the risk of experiencing consequences on populations similar to the Chernobyl disaster** (incl long term consequences)

Operating experience

- **30 years of experience** of French and German fleets
- **Probabilistic Safety Assessment** of current plants

9/11

Ensure that **a terrorist attack will not cause a severe accident** in the context of nuclear technology diffusion worldwide



***The EPR / ATMEA design includes, from its origin, all safety progresses.***

# EPR safety objectives

- ▶ **Reduce core damage frequency by a factor 10**
- ▶ **Reduce radiological releases in case of an accident**
  - ◆ design basis accidents : no protection measures for the population
  - ◆ practical elimination of scenarios leading to large and early releases  
(*hydrogen explosion, core melt under pressure, steam explosions*)
  - ◆ in case of a severe accident, only protection measures limited in area and time can be tolerated (eg no permanent relocation)
- ▶ **Increase robustness against terrorist attacks**  
(*eg large commercial aircraft crash*)




***Severe accident mitigation is included in the design.  
These objectives define the Gen 3 (or 3+) reactors.***

# Severe accident mitigation


## Prevention of high pressure core melt

Pressurizer safety valves






Dedicated severe accident depressurization valves  
(2 x 2 valves)

## Elimination of H2 risk



## Short and long term function of containment ensured



## Prevention of steam explosions




***A comprehensive and deterministic severe accident approach.  
A dedicated, independent and qualified line of defence in depth***

# EPR resistance to external hazards

- ▶ Strong resistance to earthquakes
- ▶ Protection against malvolent action
- ▶ Watertight buildings and doors



*Margin assessment show with a high level of confidence that*

- a Fukushima quake would have not led to a severe accident*
- buildings would have resisted the tsunami and kept the safety systems operable*

# Flooding protection



Bâtiment combustible Tranche 2 niveau - 8,50 m Local K 051  
Trémie électrique envahie

Blayais (1999)



Fukushima (2011)



Fort Calhoun (2011)



***Flooding can be caused by a variety of phenomenon, in many places of the world, even in the absence of outstanding tsunami.***

# Support system : power

## Physical protection



- ▶ Diesels & fuel tanks housed in reinforced buildings

## Physical separation



- ▶ 2 buildings located on each side of the reactor building

## Redundancy & diversification



- ▶ 4 main 100% redundant diesels
- ▶ 2 additional SBO diesels
- ▶ batteries: 12h autonomy

**6 emergency diesels plus batteries: redundant, diversified and protected**

## Support system : heat-sink

- ▶ **Water intake is a system, to be protected**
- ▶ **Heat-sink is also a part of the environment**  
*water can turn into mud, disappear, be loaded with debris, ice etc...*

Unit 3 Sea Pump Area



Unit 5,6 Intake Screen Area



***Because heat-sink can be impaired by changes in the environment, there is interest to consider an alternate heat-sink.***



# Main Coolant Pumps



- ✓ 220 MCP built by AREVA
- ✓ Excellent track record
- ✓ Innovation on seals
  - Stand Still Seal System
  - Hydrodynamic Seals



***Leak tight MCP seals (without injection) make a significant safety step***

## Digitalized I&C




- ▶ Major breakthrough in nuclear since N4
- ▶ Much enhanced analysis and synthesis capabilities
- ▶ User friendly (HMI) and much suited to the young generations

➤➤ *A major safety progress in the human factor field*


# ATMEA




APWR




ATMEA1



EPR



SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM  
ADVANCED ACCUMULATOR



DIVERSITY IN HEAT SINKS & EPS  
(DIVISION X)



**ATMEA1 benefits from EPR and APWR innovations**

# Conclusion

*The major innovation in Gen 3 / Gen 3+ is expected in the safety philosophy and objectives.*

*Technology and engineering innovation to be evaluated in this respect*